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Information asymmetries create incentives for investors to acquire information about stocks. Understanding investors' strategies for acquiring information is important because the information learned is likely to influence investors' choices among stocks and their optimal portfolio allocation strategy. Two recent papers (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010 ) study the investor's information choice problem in an economy with multiple risky assets whose payoffs are correlated due to exposure to one or more common risk factors.
Both papers predict that investors will acquire information about common risk factors. In Peng and Xiong (2006) , who refer to this strategy as "category" learning, the important friction that motivates the result is limited attention. In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) , "category" learning enables the investor to acquire a more precise information signal about all of the assets in the category, which increases the returns to learning.
Models of information acquisition are challenging to test empirically because the information acquired by investors is unobservable. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) , however, explicitly link category learning to observable investment decisions. They show that when portfolio choice is preceded by a choice to learn, it is optimal for investors to acquire information about a single underlying risk factor and to invest more in firms exposed to the risk factor, forgoing first-best portfolio diversification. 1 In this paper we examine institutional investors' stock investment decisions to empirically test whether, when confronted with multiple risky assets with correlated payoffs, investors appear to engage in category learning and acquire information about a risk factor common to multiple stocks. We investigate industry risk as a common risk factor about which investors would choose to learn. Both Peng and Xiong (2006) and Van Nieuwerburgh and 2 Veldkamp (2010) suggest industry risk as a natural candidate for a risk factor about which investors could learn, presumably because a better understanding of the production and cost functions underlying an industry can be applied to valuations of multiple firms. In addition, empirical evidence suggests analysts and investors may engage in category learning about industries. Analysts tend to specialize in one industry, which leads to better forecasting (O'Brien, 1990; Dunn and Nathan, 2005) , while actively managed mutual funds that concentrate their funds in specific industries perform better than less concentrated funds (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005) .
If investors acquire information about industry risk and apply this information to stocks that are exposed to the industry factor, then investors should exhibit preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure because they have more information about high exposure stocks.
The idea that investors show preferences for assets about which they have greater information has been applied to explain other cases of observed investor preferences such as the home bias puzzle (e.g., French and Poterba, 1991; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Huberman, 2001; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009) . Coval and Moskowitz (1999) , for example, find evidence consistent with information asymmetries between local and non-local investors being the explanation for the observation that institutional investors overinvest in local stocks. 2 Over the period from 1984 to 2006, we find evidence of a strong positive association between investor interest and a stock's industry exposure. Industry exposure is measured as the 2 The home bias literature prior to Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) informally appealed to the ideas in the "category" learning models to explain the information asymmetry. For example, studies would assert that local investors had greater "exogenous" information endowments such as knowledge about local resources and institutions or lower costs of endogenous information production due to superior access to information or information processing. These factors increase the returns to information acquisition. 3 sensitivity of a firm's stock return to its industry return after controlling for the market return.
We examine two aspects of investor interest. First, in firm-level tests, we show that the number of institutional investors holding a firm's stock increases in the stock's industry exposure.
Ceteris paribus, a stock with high industry exposure, on average, has 13% more institutional investors than a stock with low industry exposure. Second, in investor-level tests, we document that institutional investors systematically overweight (underweight) high (low) industry exposure stocks by 0.7% (1.0%) relative to the weights implied by the CAPM.
Our results are consistent with the prediction that investors choose to learn about a common risk factor, industry risk, and apply the acquired knowledge to multiple stocks with high exposure to the risk factor, forgoing the benefits of portfolio diversification. However, to better understand whether category learning is the likely source of the observed investor preferences for industry exposure, we investigate cross-sectional variation in investor preferences for industry exposure as a function of two factors: 1) institutional investor characteristics associated with the investor's costs and benefits of information acquisition, and 2) industry characteristics that affect the returns to learning about industry risk.
With respect to investor characteristics, we show that smaller institutional investors display significantly stronger preferences for industry exposure than larger institutional investors. Stocks with high industry exposure experience 15% more smaller institutional investors than stocks with low industry exposure, compared to 7% more medium size institutional investors and just 0.4% more larger institutions. Under the assumption that information acquisition costs per dollar invested are higher for smaller institutions, smaller institutions are likely to have greater incentives than larger institutions to acquire information 4 about an industry factor and invest in stocks exposed to that factor, as opposed to directly acquiring unique firm-specific information about multiple firms.
Next, using the investor classifications developed by Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 , we find that "transient" institutional investors exhibit the strongest interest in industry exposure, followed by "quasi-indexers" and then "dedicated investors."
3 Stocks with high industry exposure experience 15% more transient institutional investors than stocks with low industry exposure, and transient investors overweight high industry exposure stocks by 4% and underweight low industry exposure stocks by 3%. Quasi-indexers display the next greatest preferences, while dedicated owners show no significant interest in high industry exposure stocks.
The patterns across investment styles are consistent with institutions of different investment styles having different information acquisition strategies and incentives. Given that transient investors hold a large number of stocks and rely predominantly on public information, learning about an industry factor and applying that information to stocks with high exposure to the industry factor is an efficient way for transient investors to acquire and utilize information.
In contrast, the incentives for dedicated owners to learn about industry risk are much smaller as dedicated owners prefer to acquire unique firm-specific information about a small number of firms.
The results across institutions with different characteristics are consistent with category learning being the source of investor preferences for stocks with high industry exposure. Those investors who have the greatest incentives to acquire information about multiple stocks as efficiently as possible, namely smaller and transient investors, exhibit the strongest preferences 5 for industry exposure. In contrast, institutions who do not benefit from acquiring information common to multiple stocks, such as dedicated owners, do not exhibit preferences for industry exposure.
With respect to industry characteristics, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) predict that investors will have the greatest incentives to acquire information about industries in which the returns to learning are the greatest. We hypothesize that the returns to acquiring information about an industry factor will be greatest in industries in which returns are most distinct from market returns. We refer to this characteristic as industry specificity and measure it as the incremental explanatory power of an industry factor over and above the market risk factor for firm-level returns within each of the 30 Fama-French industries. We identify five highspecificity industries including mining, utilities, and oil and gas; and five low-specificity industries including consumer goods, wholesale, and services. We predict that the benefits of category learning should be greatest in high-specificity industries.
Consistent with our prediction, within high specificity industries a stock with high industry exposure has 30% more institutional investors than a stock with low industry exposure, ceteris paribus. Within low specificity industries the difference is just 5%. In addition, institutions overweight high industry exposure stocks by 4% and underweight low exposure stocks by 6% in high specificity industries. In contrast, within low specificity industries there is no evidence that institutions overweight high exposure stocks, while low exposure stocks are underweighted by just 1%. Given that returns to learning should be greatest within high specificity industries, the stronger preferences in high specificity industries are consistent with category learning being the source of investor preferences for industry exposure. Overall, these results support the notion that both the returns to learning about a risk factor as well as differences in information acquisition costs and investment objectives are important determinants of information acquisition strategies, and hence investor preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure.
While our main findings and cross-sectional results are consistent with investors learning about a risk factor common to multiple stocks, as predicted by Peng and Xiong (2006) Second, our finding that investors exhibit strong preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure contributes to the growing literature examining the determinants of investor holdings. 6 An important distinction between our analysis and previous studies is that we are able to specifically link the cross-sectional variation in investor preferences for stocks to the information acquisition strategies of investors.
Third, that investors exhibit strong preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure may have implications for a firm's risk management decisions. If a manager understands that industry exposure is a characteristic that investors are attracted to due to the presence of information asymmetries, this may create incentives for some firms to not hedge and instead remain exposed to the underlying assets of the industry in order to obtain the liquidity benefits associated with greater investor interest (e.g., Merton, 1987; Chordia, Subrahmanyam, 8 and Anshuman, 2001 , Chan, 2002 , Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003 , Acharya and Pedersen, 2005 .
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This prediction is noteworthy because it is opposite to the predictions from existing optimal hedging theories which suggest that market imperfections increase incentives for firms to manage risk. 8 We view the analysis in this paper of the investor interest in industry exposure as the first step in the process of understanding how investor preferences affect firms' hedging decisions.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical tests and data. Section 3 documents a positive relation between investor interest and industry exposure.
Section 4 examines cross-sectional variation in preferences for industry exposure based on investor characteristics, industry characteristics, and interactions of the two. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical methodology
We conduct two types of analysis: 1) firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors holding a stock conditional on the stock's industry exposure, and 2) investor-level tests of portfolio weights conditional on the stock's industry exposure. percentile exposure for its industry group for year y. By construction, the indicator variables control for the possibility that investors are attracted to a particular industry and not to withinindustry exposure. The ranking is done before requiring that the sample firms have non-missing
Compustat data that is necessary in the subsequent analysis, reducing selection bias. Second, an out of sample experiment suggests that INDEXP predicts future exposure.
For each industry, at the start of year y + 1, we form an equally weighted portfolio that goes long stocks classified as high exposure (BETAHIGH = 1) as of year-end y and short sells low exposure stocks (BETALOW = 1). The portfolio is rebalanced annually. We regress the returns from the portfolio strategy on the excess returns from the market portfolio and the relevant industry portfolio: 
We estimate equation (3) Significance levels are based on a Z-statistic associated with the annual t-statistics. 12 Throughout the paper, when we report the estimates from equation (3) for the full sample or for sample partitions, all the control variables are included in the model specification, but the results for the control variables are tabulated only in the first set of reported results.
Investor interest
We use the number of institutional investors that hold a firm's stock as a proxy for investor interest. LNUMINST is the natural log of 1 + the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y. Data on annual institutional ownership are from the Thomson Financial 13-
where t j is the t-statistic for year j, N is the number of years, and t and ) (t 12 F database. The Thomson database is based on the universe of 13-F filings without any selection or removal of firms. The only potential selection issues are that holdings under $20,000 are not required to be reported on a 13-F filing, and institutions that exercise investment discretion over less than $100 million in equity are not required to file a form 13-F. Since all of our firms are publicly traded, we assume that the firm has zero institutional investors if it is not included in the reported holdings of any institutions on the Thomson Financial database.
We also considered alternative proxies for investor interest including share turnover and the number of mutual funds holding a stock. All results are robust to the using either share turnover or the number of mutual funds holding a stock. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the alternatives.
Control variables
We draw control variables (CONTROL) from four papers that examine the determinants of institutional ownership: Del Guercio, 1996 , Falkenstein, 1996 , Gompers and Metrick, 2001 , and Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009 . Broadly speaking, these papers include various specifications of proxies for the following constructs: Firm size, leverage, growth, share price, systematic risk, dividend yield, past returns, turnover, return volatility, and firm age. Appendix B provides a detailed description of our proxies for these constructs.
The control variables are particularly important when modeling investor interest for a particular stock characteristic such as industry exposure. Investors often categorize stocks into broad asset classes such as large-capitalization, value, growth, and momentum, before deciding how to allocate funds across classes (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) . By including proxies for size, value, and momentum as control variables we minimize the likelihood that our findings can be 13 attributed to a positive correlation between industry exposure and a common characteristic used by investors to assign stocks into a particular asset class.
13 Table 2 reports means and medians for the control variables separately for the high exposure (BETAHIGH), low exposure (BETALOW), and the remaining medium exposure (BETAMED) firms. There is a robust monotonic relation between industry exposure and turnover. High exposure firms also tend to be younger, have lower dividend yields and market betas, and higher debt-to-equity ratios than low exposure firms. Market-to-book ratios, which prior literature has used as a proxy for growth opportunities, do not vary significantly across the exposure categories.
(Insert Table 2 here.)
Investor-level tests: Portfolio weights as a function of industry exposure
Our second prediction is that institutional investors will overweight high industry exposure stocks in their portfolios and underweight low industry exposure stocks relative to the weights implied by CAPM. To test this prediction, we examine the reported holdings of institutional investors in the Thomson 13-F database.
The percent of the portfolio that an institutional owner (j) holds in stocks of exposure type e (high, medium, or low) in each of the 29 Fama-French industries (i) in year y (PHELD) is:
where MV is the market value of the stocks. S denotes the number of firms within industry i in year y with industry exposure level e that institution j invests in, and F denotes the total number of firms within industry i in year y that institution j invests in. The weight is computed for each institution for each year (y) between 1984 and 2006.
An institution's percent held is compared to the CAPM benchmark weight that reflects no preference for industry exposure. The benchmark weight (w) is computed as the value weighted percentage of stocks classified as having high, medium, or low exposure (e) in our sample for each industry (i) in each year (y):
where G denotes the number of firms in industry i in year y with industry exposure level e, and N denotes the total number of firms in industry i in year y.
The excess (XS) weight in each exposure category equals the percent held minus the benchmark weight:
. e e e ijy ijy iy
The excess weights across the three exposure categories for each institution-industry-year observation sum to zero. The null hypothesis that institutions do not overweight (underweight) high (low) industry exposure stocks implies that the excess invested in the high (low) exposure category is zero:
0.
e ijy XSBETA  Our computation of excess weights is similar to that of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) .
However, they create a continuous measure of portfolio excess weights by multiplying the excess weights at the firm level by the geographical distance between the fund and the firm relative to 15 the average geographical distance between the fund and all firms in the portfolio. We do not follow a similar approach, which would be to multiply our excess weights by INDEXP relative to the average INDEXP to create a similar continuous measure because, unlike geographical distance, INDEXP is an estimate from a regression and subject to estimation error. As an alternative, we create three separate continuous variables that represent the excess weight an institution invests in high, medium, and low industry exposure stocks within each industry in each year. Grouping stocks into three categories based on INDEXP mitigates the impact of estimation error. associated with firm size, market-to-book ratios, share turnover, return volatility, stock market betas, past returns, inclusion in the S&P 500 index, and listing on NASDAQ; and negatively associated with the inverse of price, dividend yields, debt-to-equity ratios, and firm age.
Results of the full sample analysis
If investors engage in category learning -learning about industry risk -and apply this information to stocks exposed to the industry risk factor, then we expect to observe a positive relation between industry exposure and investor interest. In Table 3 (Insert Table 3 here.)
The investor-level tests in Panel B of Table 3 provide further evidence of investor interest in industry exposure. There is statistically significant evidence that institutions overweight high industry exposure stocks by 0.73% relative to their CAPM weights and underweight low industry exposure stocks by one percent. Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that investors do display preferences for stocks with high industry exposure.
14 The finding in Table 3 that institutions exhibit preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure is consistent with predictions of category learning models (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010) . However, a potential alternative explanation is that industry exposure is correlated with financial statement transparency. This explanation assumes that firms with more industry exposure are also more transparent. A correlation between transparency and industry exposure will exist if: 1) firms with fewer operating segments and less complex intra-firm relationships have greater industry exposure, and 2) less complexity of this type is associated with greater information precision (i.e., transparency) about firm value (Baldwin, 1984; Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith, 2004) .
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The assumption that firms with fewer operating segments and less complex intra-firm relationships have greater industry exposure seems plausible given evidence in Lamont (1997) that more concentrated firms have greater cash flow risk associated with the underlying assets.
However, it remains an empirical issue since highly concentrated firms may engage in financial hedging to help reduce their underlying exposure.
To explore this alternative explanation for the observed investor interest in industry exposure, we sort firms based on two measures of the degree of line-of-business diversification.
The first sorting is single-segment firms and multi-segment firms (regardless of the number of segments). The second sorting is quartiles of firms based on one minus the firm's revenue-based concentration ratio, which is computed following Comment and Jarrell (1995) . The minimum value of this measure is zero for a single segment firm and it approaches one as diversity increases (concentration decreases). Firms are ranked within industry by year. If investors are attracted to industry exposure because it is negatively correlated with line-of-business diversification, and therefore positively correlated with financial statement transparency, we expect to observe no evidence that investors are attracted to industry exposure within partitions of firms with similar levels of diversification.
(Insert Table 4 here.) Table 4 shows a positive relation between investor interest and the continuous measure of industry exposure (INDEXP) within all diversification-sorted sub-samples. The coefficients on INDEXP in all portfolios are similar in magnitude to the results reported in Table 3 . In addition, the coefficients on BETAHIGH and BETALOW within all the diversification-sorted sub-samples 18 are similar in magnitude and significance levels to those presented in Table 3 . 15 Thus, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that our results in Table 3 are not driven by investor interest in less complex (i.e., more transparent) single-segment firms.
Cross-sectional analysis
The previous analysis documents a significant positive relation between institutional investor interest and industry exposure, consistent with the predictions of category learning models that investors choose to learn about a common risk factor, industry risk, and apply the acquired knowledge to multiple stocks with high exposure to the risk factor. To better understand whether category learning is the likely source of the observed investor preferences for industry exposure, in this section we investigate cross-sectional variation in investor preferences for industry exposure as a function of two factors: 1) institutional investor characteristics associated with the investor's costs and benefits of information acquisition (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), 16 and 2) industry characteristics that affect the returns to learning about industry risk (Section 4.3). Finally, we condition on both investor and industry characteristics (Section 4.4).
15 Sub-period analysis suggests that the results are not period-specific. Segment reporting requirements changed significantly during the sample period. Between 1984 and 1997, a firm's operating segments roughly correspond to its distinct product market industries. For the remainder of the sample period, firms defined their segments based on the internal management structure of the firm, which may or may not be by industry-level product line. Our sorting criteria are more likely to capture the negative correlation between line-of business diversification and industry exposure in the earlier period when segments were primarily defined at the industry level. We re-estimate the regression models in Table 5 for the period 1984 to 1997 and the period 1998 to 2006. The results in both periods are similar to those reported. 16 Studies that decompose institutions by type typically use the investor categories provided in the Thomson Financial database: (1) bank trusts, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies and investment advisors, and (4) pension and endowment funds. These investor categories are convenient, but they are not based on a characteristic likely to be associated with information asymmetry so we do not tabulate results for the Thomson classifications. Except for banks, all types of institutions display a significant interest in high industry exposure stocks and a significant aversion to low exposure stocks. Banks exhibit only a significant aversion to low-exposure stocks.
For each cross-sectional partition, we report the results of both firm-level tests and investor-level tests of portfolio weights. For the firm-level tests, we estimate a multivariate specification of equation (3) with the numbers of investors of a particular type in a firm's stock as the dependent variables. We report the results only for the model specification that includes the indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW to measure industry exposure. Results using the continuous variable (INDEXP) are similar. (Insert Table 5 to acquire information about an industry factor and invest in stocks that remain exposed to that factor, thereby reducing information acquisition costs. is to obtain a signal about an underlying risk factor and apply this information to all stocks that are exposed to the risk factor. In contrast, dedicated investors, who invest in a handful of firms, will choose to bear the costs of acquiring unique firm-specific information.
Cross-sectional analysis by institution size

Cross-sectional analysis by institution investment style
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Panel D reports the investor-level results. Consistent with the hypothesis that investors with the greatest incentives to minimize per stock information acquisition costs (i.e., transient investors) show the greatest interest in industry exposure, we find that transient investors 18 The coefficient estimates on BETAHIGH for both transient investors and quasi-indexers are not statistically different from zero in the 1980's and early 1990's, but they are consistently significantly positive in the last ten years of the sample period (not tabulated). The rapid growth in ETFs may, at least in part, explain the increased interest in industry exposure among transient investors and quasi-indexers over the last decade. A cost effective way for ETFs to track returns in a particular sector, such as oil and gas, is to invest in the stocks of firms that have high industry exposure.
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overweight high exposure stocks by 4% and underweight low exposure stocks by 3%, while dedicated owners overweight high industry exposure stocks by 2% and do not underweight low exposure stocks.
Cross-sectional analysis by industry specificity
If category learning is the source of investor interest in industry exposure, Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) predict that investor interest will be greatest in industries where the returns to learning are largest. We hypothesize that the returns to learning about industry risk will be greatest for industries in which returns are most distinct from market returns. For stocks in these industries, which we refer to as high-specificity industries, the value of acquiring industry level information is greater as the industry factor explains a larger fraction of firm returns relative to low specificity industries.
We measure industry specificity as the incremental adjusted R 2 from adding industry returns to a standard market model. For each industry-year, we estimate a standard market model and an extended market model for every firm. The extended market model includes the equally-weighted market returns and the appropriate equally-weighted industry returns. The models are estimated using monthly return data over the period January of year y -4 to December of year y. We compute the difference between the adjusted R 2 values of the two models for each industry-year. The average annual difference for an industry is our measure of industry specificity. 19 The greater is the average difference in adjusted R 2 s, the greater is the industry specificity (SPECIFICITY). 19 An alternative metric to the difference in adjusted R 2 is the F-statistic associated with the test of whether industry returns improve model specification. The correlation between these two variables is 0.98. In addition, estimates of specificity based on the Fama-French 3-factor model are highly correlated (97%) and the estimates identify the same These five industries are designated "high-specificity" industries in the empirical analysis. For these high-specificity industries, the adjusted R 2 in the two factor market model is 17% higher in absolute terms, on average, than the adjusted R 2 in the standard market model. The industries with the lowest average specificity are: Wholesale, Electrical Equipment, Services, Games, and Consumer Goods. These five industries are considered low-specificity industries in the empirical analysis. For the low-specificity industries, the adjusted R 2 increases by just 1.3% in absolute terms following the addition of industry returns to the market model.
Our classification of industries as high, medium, or low specificity is static over the sample period, but the boxplots in Figure 1 Table 6 here.) industries as high or low specificity industries. Our measure of industry specificity is similar to the country-level synchronicity measures developed by Morck, Li, Yang, and Yeung (2004) . 20 The only exception is the specificity measure for the Coal industry. We classify the Coal industry as a highspecificity industry in all years, but it has the most significant time-series variation, which is not surprising given the small number of firms in the industry ( Panel B provides further support for our prediction that investor interest in industry exposure will be greatest in high specificity industries. In high specificity industries, a change in a firm's industry exposure from the 30 th percentile to the 70 th percentile is associated with a 27% increase in the number of institutions holding the stock compared to 12% in medium specificity industries and just 2% in low specificity industries.
Finally, investor-level tests in Table 6 Panel C show that the overweighting of high industry exposure stocks and the underweighting of low industry exposure stocks is most pronounced in high specificity industries. In high specificity industries institutions overweight high exposure stocks by 4% and underweight low exposure stocks by almost 6%. In contrast, in low specificity industries institutions do not overweight high industry exposure stocks and underweight low industry exposure stocks by only 1%.
The results in this section indicate that investor interest in industry exposure is most pronounced in high specificity industries where we expect the returns to learning about an industry factor to be greatest. As such, our findings are consistent with the predictions of learning models that show that the greater the returns to learning about a risk factor, such as industry risk, the more investors will be attracted to learn about the factor and to overweight stocks exposed to that factor (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). 
Cross-sectional analysis by investor type and industry specificity
In Table 7a we examine investor interest in industry exposure as a function of institutional characteristics separately within high specificity and low specificity industries.
Previously in Table 5 we observed that smaller institutions had greater preferences for industry exposure than larger institutions, and that transient investors had stronger preferences for industry exposure than quasi-indexers while dedicated owners did not display any preferences for industry exposure.
Within high specificity industries, all institutions, regardless of their characteristics, exhibit statistically and economically significant preferences for stocks with high industry exposure. Notably, however, the patterns in preferences across investor types are similar to those in Table 5 . For example, Panels A and B show that a change in a firm's industry exposure from the 30 th percentile to the 70 th percentile is associated with a 28% (37%) increase in the number of smaller institutions (transient investors), ceteris paribus, while for larger institutions (dedicated owners) the difference is only 13% (16%), but still significantly different from zero..
In contrast, within low specificity industries there is little evidence, either in terms of statistical or economic significance, that institutions of any size or investment style exhibit preferences for industry exposure. The stronger results across investor types within high-specificity industries suggests that both the returns to learning about a risk factor as well as differences in information acquisition costs and investment objectives are important determinants of investor preferences for stocks with high levels of industry exposure.
(Insert Table 7a here.)
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The investor-level results on excess portfolio weights in Table 7b yield a similar conclusion; all of the results are amplified in the high specificity industries. For example, in high specificity industries both smaller and larger institutions overweight high industry exposure stocks by 4% -5% and underweight low industry exposure stocks by 5% -8%, while in low specificity industries the over and underweightings are much less pronounced. Similarly, both transient investors and dedicated owners overweight high industry exposure stocks and underweight low industry exposure stocks in high specificity industries, but the over and underweightings are most pronounced for transient investors -8% and 12% respectively compared to over-and under-weightings of 3% for dedicated owners.
(Insert Table 7b here.)
Conclusion
This paper shows that institutional investors exhibit statistically and economically significant preferences for industry exposure. Industry exposure is positively associated with the number of institutional investors that hold the firm's stock, and institutional investors systematically overweight high industry exposure stocks in their portfolios while underweighting low industry exposure stocks. Investor interest in industry exposure is greatest among smaller institutional investors and institutions that follow a transient investment style; and lowest among larger institutions and dedicated owners. Moreover, investor interest in stocks with high industry exposure is most pronounced among industries in which the returns to learning about industry risk are predicted to be the greatest: Mining, coal, utilities, tobacco, and oil and gas.
The finding that investor interest is positively associated with industry exposure is consistent with category learning models that predict that investors will choose to learn about a common risk factor and apply that information to invest in stocks exposed to the risk factor. The showing greater interest in high specificity industries are consistent with category learning being the source of investor interest given the greater returns to learning in those industries.
By linking the cross-sectional variation in investor preferences for stocks to the information acquisition strategies of investors our study indicates that investors may choose to acquire information about common risk factors -such as industry risk, business cycle risk or exchange rate risk -rather than focus on acquiring unique firm-specific information.
An interesting implication of our findings is that the information acquisition strategies of investors may affect firms' risk management decisions. If a firm values the liquidity benefits associated with remaining exposed to underlying industry risks, then the firm has incentives to not hedge to retain (or attract) investors.
This may help to explain why the evidence that hedging increases firm value is weak, despite theoretical predictions that hedging is a value-maximizing activity in the presence of market imperfections. For example, Jin and Jorion (2006) find no evidence that hedging increases firm value for oil and gas exploration companies. We find, however, that investor interest in industry exposure is greatest in industries such as oil and gas. Reductions in industry exposures associated with hedging may lead to lower investor interest, and hence reduced liquidity and potentially a higher cost of capital, which may offset the benefits more traditionally associated with risk management. We leave the question as to whether firms cater to investor preferences for industry exposure in their hedging decisions to future research. Table 3   Table A1 examines the robustness of our findings in Table 3 to alternative model and variable specifications. Panel A examines alternative proxies for investor interest. Columns 1 and 2 report results using share turnover as a proxy for total investor activity, as an alternative to measuring only institutional investor interest. Our examination of institutional investor interest in Table 3 is motivated by data availability rather than economic substance. Our predictions are not specific to institutional investors. In fact, under the assumption that institutions are more informed traders than individual investors, we would expect less power to detect institutional investor interest in industry exposure.
Appendix A: Robustness tests for full sample analysis in
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However, noise in proxies for individual investor interest, including share turnover, can offset the power advantages associated with greater information asymmetry in a sample of individual investors.
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We measure share turnover (TURNOVER) as the natural logarithm of average monthly turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding), computed for each firm i in each year y. 23 We estimate equation (3) with TURNOVER as the dependent variable and exclude share turnover as a control variable. Consistent with the results for the total number of institutional investors, the results in Table   A1 Panel A show a strong association between industry exposure and turnover. For example, ceteris paribus, turnover in firms with high industry exposure is 33% higher than that of firms with medium levels of exposure, while turnover in low exposure firms is 19% lower. The difference is significant in all 23 annual regressions.
Columns 3 and 4 report results using the number of mutual funds as an alternative to the number of institutional investors. LNUMFUNDS is constructed similarly to LNUMINST; it is the 21 Evidence on the underlying assumption of more informed trading by institutions is mixed (Bushee and Goodman, 2007) . 22 While evidence suggests that share turnover captures individual investor interest in part (Barber and Odean, 2008; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2006; and Loh, 2008) , it also captures disagreement among investors (Garfinkel, 2009) , and it could be driven by a handful of large institutional investors trading in large quantities, or many investors trading in smaller quantities. 23 We estimate the turnover regression separately for NASDAQ and non-NASDAQ firms recognizing that turnover is measured differently on the NASDAQ exchange. The results are similar.
natural log of 1 + the number of mutual funds that hold stock i at the end of year y. Data on annual fund ownership are from the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund database. We eliminate mutual funds that have an investment objective code (IOC) equal to 1, 5 or 6, which represent International funds, Municipal Bond funds, and Bond and Preferred Stock funds, respectively. In addition, we only retain funds with at least three annual observations in which the market value of assets at the beginning of the year is greater than $1 million. The results for LNUMFUNDS are similar to those obtained using
LNUMINST. There is a robust positive association between the number of mutual funds holding a firm's stock and the firm's industry exposure. The results using indictor variables for industry exposure (Column 4), however, are slightly less pronounced for mutual funds relative to all institutions, potentially resulting from increased noise in the mutual fund database.
24 Table A1 Panel B examines the extent to which the results in Table 3 are robust across firm size quartiles. The primary model in Table 3 (Insert Table A1 here.)
Finally, in Table A1 Panel C we examine the robustness of the results to two alternative measures of industry exposure. The first alternative is a demeaned continuous measure of industry 24 Mutual funds (i.e., registered investment companies) are a class of investors in the Thomson Financial database of 13-F filers, but data on mutual fund holdings in the mutual fund database are different from the data for the "Investment Companies" in the 13-F database. The 13-F database category of investment companies includes institutions that are not registered investment companies (i.e., not mutual funds) but that derive a significant portion of their business from the mutual fund business (determined by Thomson). In addition, holdings data on the Thomson Mutual Fund database is compiled primarily from the funds' required semi-annual reports to shareholders (N-30D filings) rather than 13-F filings.
exposure. The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate substantial differences in the average industry exposure coefficient across industries. Similar to the BETAHIGH and BETALOW indicator variables, the demeaned measure controls for the possibility that investors are attracted to particular industries rather than to within-industry exposure. The results using the demeaned measure are consistent with the results for the continuous specification of INDEXP in Table 3 . There is a robust positive relation between industry exposure and investor interest.
The second alternative measure of industry exposure is estimated using a variant of equation (1) that also includes returns on the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Industry exposures estimated in the expanded model are highly correlated with INDEXP. As Table A1 Panel C shows, the results for estimation of the investor interest model (equation (3)) that use this alternative proxy for industry exposure are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 3 . An augmented version of equation (3) that includes the factor loadings on SMB and HML as control variables and uses this alternative proxy for industry exposure also yields similar results. Table A1 . Additional specifications of the primary analysis in Table 3 Results for alternative specifications of the model and variables used in the primary analysis reported in Table 3 . Panel A reports the results using share turnover as an alternative proxy for investor interest. Panel B reports the results across size quartiles of the sample firms. The quartiles are recalculated for each calendar year. Panel C reports the results using alternative measures of industry exposure. The first alternative is a standardized (demeaned) measure of the continuous variable INDEXP within industry/year. The second alternative measure is the estimate of industry exposure using an extended 3-factor Fama-French model (INDEXP3). We report results of estimation of identical models to those specified in Table 3 , but using the INDEXP3 estimates and indicator variables based on the extended 3-factor model estimates (BETAHIGH3 and BETALOW3). We also report results using these alternative measures and augmenting the models in Table 3 to include the coefficient estimates on SMB and HML. All models include the control variables defined in Table 3 Table 2 ). -0.0920*** BETAHIGH3 0.0320**
Appendix B: Summary of control variables
Summary of control variables used in the analysis. We draw the control variable constructs for the determinants of institutional ownership from four sources: Del Guercio (1996 ), Falkenstein (1996 , Gompers and Metrick (2001) , and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). All variables except firm age and the indicator variables for inclusion in the S&P 500 index and Nasdaq stocks are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles.
Construct Name Description
Firm size LOGSIZE_MVE Natural log of the market value of equity (in $ thousands) at year end.
Market-to-book ratio LOGMB Natural log of market value of equity divided by common book equity at year end.
Share price INVPRICE Inverse of stock price at year end.
Systematic risk MKTBETA2
Market beta from estimation of the two-factor extended market model in equation (2).
Leverage DE RATIO Total long-term debt (including current portion) divided by total common equity at year end.
Turnover TURNOVER Natural log of average monthly turnover during the year.
Returns AVGRET Average monthly return during the year.
Idiosyncratic return volatility RETVOL Standard deviation of daily firm returns during the year.
Firm age FIRMAGE Natural log of the number of months from the CRSP start date to year end.
Included in the S&P 500 index S&P500 Indicator variable = 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 index as of year end, and = 0 otherwise.
Trades on NASDAQ exchange NASDAQ Indicator variable = 1 if the firm is traded on the NASDAQ exchange as of year end according to CRSP and = 0 if it is traded on the NYSE/AMEX.
Figure 1: Industry specificity
To measure industry specificity for industry j in year y, we estimate a standard market model and an extended market model for each firm i within industry j using monthly return data over the period January of year y -4 to December of year y. The extended market model includes the appropriate equally-weighted industry returns and the equally-weighted market returns. For each firm i in year y, we compute the difference between the adjusted R 2 values of the two models. We use the average difference in adjusted R 2 values within an industry as our measure of industry specificity. The box plot below summarizes the industry specificity across our sample period of 1984 -2006.
Table 1. Summary of exposure measures by industry
INDEXP is the mean of the firm-specific estimates of the monthly industry factor betas. δ ind is the estimated industry factor exposure in year y+1 for a portfolio that buys high industry exposure firms and shorts low industry exposure firms, where exposure is measured using historical data (see equation 2). δ ind is hypothesized to be greater than zero if the BETAHIGH and BETALOW classifications capture meaningful differences in industry factor price exposure. (*){**}[* 
where t j is the t-statistic for year j, N is the number of years, and t and ) (t  are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the N realizations of t j . Z has a t distribution with N−1 degrees of freedom. Table 2 ). Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 23 annual regressions.
Panel A: Stock-level tests of the number of institutional investors
(1) Table 2 ). Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 23 annual regressions. ) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). The percentiles are recalculated for each industry for each calendar year. All models include the control variables defined in Table 3  ( Table 2 ). Table 6 . Industry specificity and investor attraction to exposure Average annual coefficient estimates on proxies for industry factor price exposure from models of the determinants of investor interest. Investor interest is measured as institutional investor interest (LNUMINST). Industry factor price exposure is measured by indicator variables that equal 1 if a firm's industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70 th (30 th ) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Panel A reports results for models that include a continuous measure of industry specificity (SPECIFICITY) and interaction terms of SPECIFICITY with BETAHIGH and BETALOW. Panel B reports coefficient estimates on BETAHIGH and BETALOW for firms that operate in high-specificity, medium-specificity, and low-specificity industries. All models include the control variables defined in Table 3 Table 2 ). Table 7a . Firm-level tests of investor interest in industry exposure conditional on both industry specificity and investor type Average annual coefficient estimates for industry factor price exposure proxies from multivariate models of the determinants of the log of 1 + the number of institutions of a given type that hold a firm's stock estimated separately for high and low specificity industries. Results are presented for investor types based on investor size (Panel A) and investment style (Panel B). Factor price exposure is measured by indicator variables that equal 1 if a firm's industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70 th (30 th ) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). The percentiles are recalculated for each industry for each calendar year. All models include the control variables defined in Table 3 Table 2 ). Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 23 annual regressions Table 2 ). 
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